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Science in society
Nowadays, science is in fashion. It pervades society, the
media and even domestic spaces. However, being in fash-
ion has its price, which, in the case of science, is manifested
by the excess of science articles and reports in the media
but also by the absence of both standard criteria and control
of content. Everybody seems willing to give his or her scien-
tific opinion in order to justify a position. Widely distributed
magazines tend to use and misuse science. Advertising
agencies employ it in order to guarantee and certify the ex-
cellence of many products, to back up claims regarding the
benefits that some habits or products can provide to the
population and to warn of the dangers of others. In short, sci-
ence serves as a measure of everything.
The public perception and acceptability of science has
been accompanied by cultural discourses, either explicit or
implicit, which suggest that science, being objective, pre-
dictive and beneficial to humans, should also incorporate
the values of welfare, tolerance, love of the truth and cooper-
ation. These kinds of statements are projected into the future
to predict that science will be able to solve any kind of prob-
lem, including famine, poverty and diseases. Thus, we could
say that the future has been placed in the hands of science.
This aura of popularity promotes the radicalization of sci-
ence, either negatively or positively . By associating science,
in the public mind, with the maximal expression of rationality,
utility and security, any breach in these expectations in-
evitably shifts the discussion towards the realm of risk, un-
certainty, confusion, distrust and even a sense of economic
and political conspiracy. For example, following an accident
or hazardous situation with a potentially widespread, serious
impact, scientific experts in the field are frequently called
upon to reassure the public, especially if politicians and  in-
dustry related technicians are unable to provide satisfactory
answers. 
Lack of solutions is translated into disappointment among
the population, not only because apparently there is not any
control over the particular problem at hand and its side ef-
fects, but also because the public realizes that, in everyday
life, so-called progress tends to be an illusion. This feeling
reinforces the conviction that the driving force of science, as
an institution representative of the rational instrument of cap-
italism, depends on the impersonal laws of marketing, on
pharmaceutical and armament industries, and on powers
working on behalf of national and international security inter-
ests. For this reason, critics and anti-system movements
consider science to be domineering, bourgeois, masculine
and white. By convincingly stating that the purpose of sci-
ence is not truth but power, the gap between science and
society ends up linking the idea that science has no limits
with that of the limitation of human freedom.
Certainly, science is not only in fashion, but is also the fo-
cus of public debate. Apologists for the purity of science
claim that it can be kept free of the prejudices, interests and ir-
rationalities of politics. In addition, they argue that science is
independent of its technological applications. But how does
giving science this unquestionable status help to dispel pub-
lic ambivalence? How can we counter the defensive attitudes
of scientists regarding the neutrality of their work, as well as
the claim that rigor, high standards and excellence are inher-
ent features of science? How can the liberal political vision of
the expert, that converting knowledge into power will create a
political order supporting unlimited material progress, be
conveyed? How can we best confront the crucial issue of rec-
ognizing or determining how culture–that constant process of
choices that is called the Western World-influences the con-
struction of science? Therefore, how can we educate the pub-
lic so that it acquires a better understanding of science?
Science in a cultural key
Replacing ambivalence and mistrust with transparency and
an appreciation of the educational benefits and practical ap-
plications requires an understanding of science in a cultural
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key. This requirement is not new, In fact, it is a constitutive as-
pect of the history of science in the Western World; it is also
part of the systemic nature of science and has laid the foun-
dations of epistemology. Science promotes the acquisition of
knowledge about the so-called material world. What it says
about the world itself and how it works, is not so simple, how-
ever. It is not just a question of accumulating data, magnifying
observation and experience, and making more precise in-
struments. Science is a mirror of what we call reality. But it is
not a flat mirror, rather one shaped by a certain set of expecta-
tions and by the insight provided by a scientific process that
uses precise measuring instruments as well as conceptual
devices. The questions asked of science and how they are
framed depend the historical, social context in which hy-
potheses are formulated and experiments are carried out.
In that sense, science is a cultural system that is invigorat-
ed by: (i) activating criticism, (ii) removing boundaries be-
tween disciplines, and (iii) providing a context for itself, both
ethically and socially. Regarding the first point, there is no
need to worry. In fact, epistemological criticism systemati-
cally denies science its mythical hiding places, i.e. the rever-
ent idealizations and images of science and scientists as the
discoverers of nature and the revealers of the underlying
structure of all knowledge. It also denies a closed, static and
homogeneous concept of scientific rationality which is not
compatible with the fact that, in science, the progressive ac-
cumulation of generally accepted truths is based on a step-
wise process of observation and discussion, and  that there
are other sources of knowledge over which science has no
authority. These statements are based upon the intellectual
exploration of scientific ventures [2,3,5]: clarification of con-
cepts, criteria for selecting the study object and aims,  influ-
ence of procedures and  measurement tools, logic and
methods used in the process of justification and validation in
order to formulate a paradigm or recognize a paradox, and
tension between continuity and innovation. 
Taken together, these constraints form a set of internal
rules of thinking and applied action, but at the same time it
can be readily appreciated that the critical consideration of
science provides us with many intellectual tools, even for
use in every-day life. To think scientific ideas allows potential
limits to be recognized and certain concepts or methods to
be ruled out so to avoid to think exclusively  through  cate-
gories and dichotomies derived historically and transmitted
by educational means.  Never, then, methodologies, stan-
dardized protocols, and statistical resolutions can serve as a
justification for neutrality and objectivity neither can be ana-
lytical reliability a substitute for consensus. 
Some forms of feminist criticism [4] have attempted to
provide an intellectual defense of the viewpoint which states
that there are no innocent powers representing the world.
Thus, objectivity is nothing but knowledge that is both tem-
porary in its use and in its contextualization of facts. It is nec-
essary to redefine the meaning of objectivity so that it pro-
vides us with the tools to avoid the subjectivity of intentions,
beliefs, aims and values in order to be able to capture the
nature of things. While subjectivity currently serves as part of
the dichotomy subject-object; it must be introduced into the
«objective» processes of observation and construction of
data, not in a tacit way, but as an aspect that should be con-
sidered because of its ability to affect and to modify the pro-
duction of knowledge.
Another interesting dichotomy that is being increasingly
challenged is the definition of natural versus artificial reality.
Laboratory work is carried out in an environment that is artifi-
cially created, using isolated natural objects that enable re-
searchers to generate certain phenomena that for this very
reason are not found elsewhere. Therefore, the results are
not external phenomena, but rather a set of descriptions and
rules of procedure that has been constructed by scientists.
Even though the existence of an external world is not refut-
ed, this approach reveals the virtual nature of scientific reali-
ty. Under these criteria, the dichotomy between that which is
natural and that which is a product of scientific culture dis-
appears. Artificiality takes on a new dimension, serving as
the focus of techno-scientific research, either in making of
nature a series of manufactured objects, or in reintroducing
them experimentally into alternative forms of life, such as
those generated by nanotechnology. 
The scientific community
Science considered out of context and separated from both
social reality and the cultural implications of technology  be-
comes a privileged territory –an island of intellectual protec-
tion that promotes error and/or self-serving recognition. To
ignore this, either willingly or unwillingly,  encourages prob-
lematic political and economic associations. These con-
cerns have been transferred from the theoretical body of sci-
ence both to research institutions and to the role of scientists.
In response, social sciences, especially the sociology of sci-
ence, have analyzed science as an institution. This interest in
the scientific community is not recent, however. In 1973, Mer-
ton and other sociologists [7] examined science as a social
institution made up of communities of researchers whose
weapons are knowledge, talent, experience and scientific in-
struments. Such communities are strongly stratified and
share values, alliances and arguments in order to achieve
scientific authority and intellectual prestige. Symbolic assets
that, in turn, are converted into forms of shared capital:
grants, scholarships, prizes, improved facilities, and the best
students; in other words, nuclei of power that can affect the
priorities of scientific progress.
The incursion of the social sciences into the realm of sci-
entific privacy has been extended to the study of research
laboratories using an ethnographic approach, as if they
were indeed small communities. Microsociology studies
[6,9] have been carried out with the goal of identifying the re-
search processes and relations among scientist that medi-
ate the kinds of scientific knowledge produced in laborato-
ries. The component parts of this process can be observed
ethnographically and include data processing, note taking,
criteria applied to choosing experiments, social relation-
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ships between researchers, and also the analysis of contro-
versies and theoretical transactions,  the use of language to
formulate the feasibility of independent facts, and the
metaphorical formulations employed in scientific articles to
communicate research results and make them credible to
other colleagues and to peer-review committees of high-im-
pact journals. These kinds of studies help us to understand
that the context of scientific work consists of a wide range of
trans-scientific fields as well as networks of social relation-
ships that go beyond the disciplinary boundaries of each
scientific community.
Cultural anthropology contributes to scientific knowledge
by equipping it with additional, cultural tools. Not only does it
provide the aforementioned ethnographic studies on re-
search laboratories, but it also tracks the spread of knowl-
edge through scientific and non-scientific communities. Fur-
thermore, it searches for information on perception,
acceptability and distribution of risk and safety in regulatory
agencies and bioethics committees, media and especially
on the subjects of experimentation and opinion,  i.e. pa-
tients, families and segments of the general public.
Science’s relationship with other disciplines
Anthropological and sociological studies have revealed that
science is not a passive form of knowledge. It is, instead, the
development of theoretical, cultural and techno-social con-
structions that can be used to change the nature of all that,
until now, was considered to be reality and even the ultimate
truth. This conclusion inverts the models of the observed ver-
sus the observing disciplines. Thus, in the humanities, the
idealization of science as focusing solely on natural physical
models, as if they were paradigms of social order and for un-
derstanding culture,  has vanished, replaced by the recogni-
tion that the boundaries and compartments separating disci-
plines that no longer bear the ontological status of privilege
must give way to multi-methodological forms of criticism and
interdisciplinarity. Science, philosophy, sociology and an-
thropology interact with each other. Ideas and their expres-
sion must therefore adapt to this comparative and reflective
approach that joins disciplines into systems of knowledge. By
sharing resources and creating joint-venture approaches,
these systems of knowledge reflect a process of complex ac-
tions and reactions the diversity of which is open to all kinds of
interpretation: a network of apprenticeships where data are
discussed and knowledge is produced or destroyed de-
pending on the situation and the definition of problems.
This approach breaks with the perception of the hegemony
of scientific knowledge. Locating science in a context of social
reality prevents the colonialism of knowledge, which is also
present in models of human intellectual development. In this
framework, anthropology has placed science farthest along
the path of human evolution with respect to the hierarchy Mag-
ic and Religion since Western rationality has been the main cri-
terion used to determine the value of knowledge derived from
other cultures, and even its utility.  However, ethnographic re-
search itself has pointed out that scientists have searched for,
analyzed and subsequently transformed indigenous knowl-
edge and its applications, especially herbal therapy,  as if they
were manufactured products, packaged and distributed to its
own profit with little thought to the effects on local markets and
medical practice.  This lack of consideration, or kidnapping of
experience, explains the substitution of traditional medicine
and local techniques to sustain resources by the uncontrolled
introduction of biotechnologies,  especially agro-alimentary
technologies, e.g. alien seeds and pesticides.
Many may think that the role of science is not to solve so-
cial challenges, but to clarify intellectual questions and theo-
retical problems. Indeed, this is one of its aims; however, it is
one thing to convert knowledge into an asset of limited val-
ue, which only confirms a unique hegemony, and another to
accept the pluralism of knowledge. In this sense, too few
critical voices have been heard [8], and efforts to create an
intercultural convergence of both universal and local knowl-
edge and its practices are still in their infancy. Such efforts
are not merely of intellectual interest or a refinement of a par-
ticular attitude; rather, they are needed to face critical, inter-
related  and global  problems, such as pollution, social ex-
clusion and disease, that cannot be solved quickly because
of their economic impact, the current lack of viable alterna-
tives, and the requirement for long-term sustainable so-
lutions. An effective response must include internal and ex-
ternal evaluations of the problems. This means that the
problem has to be defined by scientists, social agencies as
well as the owner of the impact or unhealthy situation so that
the design for prevention or implementation  not only takes
into account life styles and local knowledge but it becomes a
co-laboratory for common responsibility.
These intercultural approaches will give a new dimension
to science. Nowadays, uniformity, standardization and con-
formity are not the best means for navigating new directions in
science, neither is maintaining the disciplinary boundaries
that have defined the inclusion and exclusion of certain types
of knowledge. This situation was recognized by universities
that several years ago adopted interdisciplinary programs of
study and thus a dialogue with alternative sources of knowl-
edge. The ability to incorporate other methods and systems
of knowledge as well as conjoint responsibility has proved to
test both the genuine flexibility of conceptual systems and
their utility in recognizing limitations and alternatives.
At this point, we cannot continue dividing human beings
and their reality into two dimensions: scientific and cultural
because it has side effects. To do so would mean doubting
again about risks whether they lie in the biotechnological
modification of nature or in the lack of cultural ability to rec-
ognize the mutual implications of this process and therefore
the need for prevention and precaution. 
Ethics in science
Science, considered as a human venture, does not have
boundaries, but it does have limits regarding its credibility
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and public authority. The ethical aspects of science have
been highly discussed over the last several years. Bioethics
commissions and committees have proliferated in all fields
of research. While a wide range of positions have been
adopted, fortunately, they are always in agreement with hu-
man rights and with the recognition of situational morals and
the individual conscience.
Beyond any declaration of principles and precautionary
rules, new approaches to scientific and social responsibility
are being sought, as Bloor proposed [1], regarding the con-
trol of results-either right or wrong-as well as to extending
ethical considerability from humans to animals and objects.
While these approaches provide guidelines rather than solu-
tions to specific problems, they nonetheless help to estab-
lish links between different systems of knowledge so as to al-
low the development of a mutual transfer of knowledge
between experts and lay people.
Hopefully, public understanding of science will eventually
reach a level that is high enough such that problems and pri-
orities will be defined and solutions will be reached by con-
sensus. Until this desideratum is achieved, it must be under-
stood that science in cultural key represents the hope of
re-theorizing and remodeling systems, organisms and com-
munities. And since scientific culture has the potential to de-
velop theories and models of and for action that reveal not
exactly how the world is, but rather how it could be, let’s be-
guin to face the design of new socio-cultural and techno-sci-
entific realities, in a responsible and sustainable way.
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